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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MELALEUCA, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Supreme Court Docket No. 39757-2012
Plainti ff-Respondent,
-vs-

Bonneville County District Court Case
No. CV-2009-2616

RICK FOELLER and NAT ALIE FOELLER,
Defendants-Appellants.
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

* **** ***** *** *
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In and for the County of Bonneville
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, District Judge.
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INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine a more egregious and unconscionable contractual provision than

Policy 20. Violations of Policy 20 are punished with a "forfeiture ... of all commissions or
bonuses payable for and after the calendar month in which the violation occurred." (R, Vol. II,
p. 348. 20( c)(i)). There is no time limitation. There is no limit on the amount of the penalty.
What might constitute a violation is vague and overreaching including "directly, indirectly or
through a third party recruiting any Melaleuca Customers or Marketing Executive to participate
in any other business venture." (R, Vol. II, p. 348, 20(a)(i)) (emphasis added). A violation can

occur from any member of the Marketing Executive's immediate household and can occur even
if the Marketing Executive does not know that the person being recruited is a Melaleuca
Customer or Marketing Executive.
In its initial order on Melaleuca's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court
correctly recognized that such a provision is unenforceable when intended solely to "deter a
breach or to punish the breaching party." (R., Vol. I, p. 65, L. 4). The District Court succinctly
set forth the Foellers' argument in this appeal. "Melaleuca seeks to retroactively take money
paid to the Foellers for sales commissions; there is no argument or evidence that these
commissions were not tied to profitable sales as a result of the Foellers' work as contractors for
Melaleuca or that these are recognizable damages." (R., Vol. I, p. 64, L. 26 - p. 65, L. 1-3).
Melaleuca has never produced any such evidence.

Instead Melaleuca relies upon a circular

argument which was adopted by the District Court on reconsideration.
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The District Court's grant of Summary Judgment following reconsideration should be
reversed. Melaleuca, as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract, must prove that it has been
damaged and the amount of those damages. Melaleuca cannot simply rely upon a forfeiture
provision in the contract without any evidence that the forfeiture bears a reasonable relationship
to damages actually suffered or anticipated.

Penalty provisions such as Policy 20 are not

enforceable.
ARGUMENT

I.

The compensation paid to the Foellers was not paid by mistake.

The central premise of Melaleuca's argument is that the compensation paid to the
Foellers during July, August, and September 2008 was either unearned or paid by mistake. This
is not correct. The Foellers earned compensation from Melalueca from 1999 until October 2008.
(R, Vol. II, p. 448', L. 3-9, i16 and p. 450, L. 17-19, if16). "Aside from bonuses earned by
growing the organization, all income earned was from commission for product that [Natalie
Foeller's] organization purchased."

(R, Vol. II, p. 448, L. 6-8, ii6).

Natalie Foeller's

organization purchased $140,000 of Melalueca products in September 2008. Id. Melalueca has
made no allegation in this case that any commissions were mistakenly paid for product or
services that were not actually purchased. Natalie Foeller "trained and supported [her] downline
organization up until the time [she] resigned [her] marketing executive position with Melaleuca
on November 13, 2008."

(R., Vol. II, p. 450, L. 14-15, i115).

compensation received from Melaleuca.
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The Foellers earned all

The sole basis for Melalueca's argument that compensation for July, August, and
September was not owed is Policy 20. However, this begs the question of whether Policy 20 can
be enforced. The circular argument that the forfeiture provided in Policy 20 does not need to be
reasonably related to any damages suffered because Policy 20 says that money was never owed
must be rejected.
II.

Whether the claimed breach of Policy 20 was "material" is not relevant.

It is neither necessary nor sufficient that a breach of contract be "material" in order for a

plaintiff to recover damages for a breach of contract. A plaintiff is entitled to damages for
breach of contract whether the breach is material or not. The plaintiff, however, must prove the
amount of its damage. In the cases relied upon by Melaleuca, the "materiality" of the breach is
relevant only because the defendant sought to avoid perfonnance of the contract entirely.
Melaleuca has not cited a single case in which a plaintiff was relieved of its burden to
show damages because the alleged breach of contract was deemed to be material. The cases
relied upon, and cited by, Melaleuca in the Respondent's Brief all deal with defendants who are
raising a defense against enforcement of a contract. As previously argued in Appellant's Brief,
JP Stravens Planning Assocs., Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 928 P.2d 46 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1996) and similar cases only provide for a defense excusing performance and cannot be
applied as a means of establishing the existence and the amount of damages. (Appellant's Brief
at p. 7, L. 7). Similarly, Schroeder v. Rose, 701 P.2d 327 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) and Anderson v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 732 P .2d 699 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987), cited by Melaleuca in
the Respondent's Brief both deal with defendants raising a defense against enforcement of a
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contract. Respondent's Brief, p. 20-21. Melaleauca also relies on Jones v. TYhiteley, 736 P.2d
1340 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) to argue that the measure of damages is the return of the
commissions paid after breach. (Respondent's Brief, p. 20, L. 9). However, the case of Jones v.
Whiteley is distinguishable because it was dealing restitution of an actual mistaken overpayment

that was made independent of any claimed forfeiture.
When the plaintiff seeks to enforce a forfeiture provision in a contract the analysis is
different and does not depend upon the nature of the breach. "[W]here the forfeiture or damage
fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and
is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is regarded as a 'penalty', and the contractual provision
therefor is void and unenforceable." Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Idaho
1954).
It makes no difference whether the claimed breach is material. In any event, the claimed

breach in this case was not material. "A substantial or material breach of contract is one which
touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering
into the contract." JP Stravens, 129 Idaho at 545, 928 P.2d at 49. "A breach of contract is not
material if substantial performance has been rendered."

Id.

In this case, Natalie Foeller

performed her duties under the contract. The compensation received by Natalie was based upon
the purchase of products from Melaleuca as well as training. According to Melaleuca "[i]n
particular, Marketing Executives are contracted to 'promote the Melaleuca business opportunity,
to support Melaleuca's policies, programs, and personnel, and to service, supervise, motivate and
train the Marketing Executives in their Marketing Organization."' (Respondent's Brief, p. 17, L.
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9). As noted above, Natalie continued to do so until her resignation in November 2008. The
claimed breach of Policy 20 did not prevent Melaleuca from receiving the benefit of those sales
and Natalie's other services. Even if it were relevant whether the claimed breach was material in
this case, "[ w ]hether a breach of contract is material is a question of fact." Id. There are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the claimed breach was material and summary judgment on
this issue was inappropriate.

III.

Policy 20 is a penalty provision.

Melaleuca offers no argument or evidence that forfeiture provided in Policy 20 is
reasonably related to any damages that Melaleuca might have suffered. Instead Melaleuca offers
vague platitudes regarding the plight of other Marketing Executives and the impact to their
income, livelihood, morale, and confidence. (Respondent's Brief, p. 3, L. 15-21, and p. 4, L. 14).

How any of these stated impacts might occur is never actually explained.

Nor does

Melaleuca explain how compensation paid to the Foellers is reasonably related to any such
impact to other Marketing Executives. According to Melaleuca, the penalty is tied to "the exact
amount by which the[ Marketing Executive] profited" rather than any damage suffered by
Melaleuca. (R., Vol. IV, p. 579, L. 11) (emphasis added). "Policy 20(c) is an attempt to prevent
Marketing Executives from profiting .... " (R., Vol. IV, p. 579, L. 16).
The only evidence in the record shows that Policy 20 is unconscionable and exists solely
for the purpose of punishing breaches. It is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relationship to any
damage that might be suffered by Melaleuca due to any breach.
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Violations of Policy 20 are punished with a "forfeiture ... of all commissions or bonuses
payable for and after the calendar month in which the violation occurred." (R, Vol. II, p. 348.
20(c)(i)). There is no time limitation. There is no limit on the amount of the penalty. What
might constitute a violation is vague and overreaching including "directly, indirectly or through a
third party recruiting any Melaleuca Customers or Marketing Executive to participate in any
other business venture." (R, Vol. II, p. 348, 20(a)(i)) (emphasis added). During the twelve

month period after termination this includes Customers and Marketing Executives "in the
Marketing Executive's Marketing Organization or Support Team" or "with whom the Marketing
Executive had contact" or "whose contact information ... the Marketing Executive or members
of his or her Immediate Household has obtained" or "whose contact information . . . the
Marketing Executive or members of his or her Immediate Household obtained at any time from
another person who obtained the information because of any other person's association with
Melaleuca."

The violation can occur from any member of the "Marketing Executive's"

immediate household and can occur "even if the Marketing Executive does not know that the
prospect is also a Melaleuca Customer or Marketing Executive." (R., Vol. II, p. 348, 20(a)(ii)(l4)). Policy 20 is the very definition of an unenforceable penalty.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
The Foellers are entitled to recover their attorney fees and court costs incurred on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120(3 ). This matter arises out of a commercial transaction.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 6

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Foellers respectfully request that the District Court's
decision to grant Melaleuca's Motion for Reconsideration, to grant summary judgment in favor
of Melaleuca, and to deny the Foellers' Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed.
DATED This 6th day of February, 2013.

J. Justin May/
Attorneys fo~ Rick and Natalie Foeller
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